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1 Introduction
Clarifying whether factor rents should be taxed or subsidized continues to be
a central issue when exploring the influence of the fiscal system on welfare.
On the broader issue of taxation eﬃciency, the framework introduced in the
seminal paper by Ramsey (1929) with infinitely-lived identical households
has often been adopted, under two prevailing approximations. One line of
research has examined the incidence of taxation on growth and welfare in
economies were public expenditures do not influence consumers’ utility or
aﬀect the production technology.1 Its main purpose is to assess the opti-
mal way to finance a given level of public expenditures by solving a second
best problem. In an alternative approach, Barro (1990) considers produc-
tive public expenditures, combining endogenous growth with the public fi-
nance literature. His work was an important breakpoint regarding the study
of the influence of public investment on growth and welfare.2 Somewhat
surprisingly, however, not much work has been done regarding the optimal
simultaneous choice of public investment and a financing rule.3
We explicitly consider the simultaneous choice of public investment and
the appropriate financing system in an endogenous growth framework where
public capital have a positive eﬀect on the private production process. In
addition to issues that will be described below, we specifically discuss whether
income from productive factors should be taxed or subsidized. We find that
raising taxes on factors’ income as part of an optimal fiscal policy is in this
framework a more pervasive result than it seems.
In a Ramsey-type setting with no externalities, taxing production factor
income will generally undermine growth and welfare. In such a setup, Judd
(1985), Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) emphasized the negative incidence
of capital income taxes on welfare. Judd (1999) also argued for a zero tax
rate on physical and human capital income in the long-run. In the presence
1Among many others, see Chamley (1986), Judd (1999), Lucas (1990), Rebelo (1990)
and Jones et al. (1993,1997).
2Empirical work by Ratner (1983), Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990), among many
others, emphasizes the positive link between public expenses and the private production
process. From a theoretical point of view, Futagami et al. (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994) and Turnovsky (1996, 2000) are variations on Barro (1990). In all them, public
revenues come from proportional income taxes and the government chooses the welfare-
maximizing ratio of productive public expenditures-to-output.
3Exceptions are, among others, Corsetti and Roubini (1996) in a two-sector endogenous
growth setting and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) in a neoclassical growth model.
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of utility or technology externalities things could change, and a government
trying to maximize welfare may want to subsidize capital income if there is
some other less distorting instrument available when the competitive mech-
anism leads to under accumulation of physical capital. On the other hand,
taxing capital rents might be growth and welfare-enhancing when there exists
some externality in the model that induces an over-accumulation of physical
capital. Often, externalities of this kind have been introduced in the produc-
tion function [Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) and Corsetti and Roubini (1996)]
or as a borrowing constraint in a stochastic environment [Chamley (2001)].
However, these results rely upon the type of taxes available to finance
public expenditures. Indeed, Jones et al. (1997) and Milesi-Ferretti and
Roubini (1998) extend the zero tax rate result to labor and consumption taxes
in models with human capital in the absence of externalities. In this setup,
Jones et al. (1997) points out that certain public revenue constraints, based
on informational and political constraints which are not explicitly modeled,
could imply that taxing productive factors in the long-run might be optimal
in a second-best sense.
Our setting links the Ramsey and Barro frameworks by looking at opti-
mal public investment and taxation in an endogenous growth economy. In
this framework, we consider some structural externalities: (i) public capital
enters as an input in the available production technology, (ii) there exists a
spillover eﬀect of aggregate private capital in the production process [as in
Romer (1986)]; (iii) there are three types of public expenses: public invest-
ment, which aﬀects production through the stock of public capital available
every period, public consumption, that directly enhances welfare and some
kind of wasteful public expenditure which does not influence production or
welfare; we also consider a fiscal externality: (iv) wasteful public expendi-
tures are a constant share of total public expenditures and exogenously given.
The need to finance every period the constant proportion of wasteful public
expenditures can be seen as a constraint of the kind suggested by Jones et
al. (1997). We allow for lump-sum as well as proportional income taxes, but
exclude the possibility of issuing any debt.4
4Certain activities of the public sector can directly aﬀect the private production process
while others influence welfare, as in our model economy: public expenditures in infrastruc-
tures, as well as those securing property rights, investment by public firms, expenditures
on education, etc., can be all considered as part of a broad concept of public investment,
since they enhance one way or another the private production process. The provision of
public goods, such as parks, sport centers, libraries, recreational areas, hospitals, muse-
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In this framework, we characterize the welfare-maximizing levels of public
investment and consumption as fractions of output, as well as the optimal
way to split the required public resources between lump-sum and income
taxes. To address the issue of wether subsidizing factor rents is desirable, we
allow for negative lump-sum or income tax rates. We show that subsidizing
factor rents is not by any means a definite result, since it depends in a non
trivial manner on the interaction between technology and fiscal externalities.
In fact, we will see that there are many instances in which taxing factors’
income is optimal. We pay special attention to the role of technological
externalities and the influence of the constant wasteful expenditures ratio in
determining whether subsidizing or taxing factor rents is welfare enhancing
as well as on determining the optimal tax/subsidy rate. As we will see, the
interaction of technological and fiscal externalities is going to be central for
taxing factors’ income to be a second best optimal policy.
Since private agents do not internalize the spillover eﬀect, they will tend
to underaccumulate physical capital, and a subsidy might move them in
the right direction. The presence of public capital in aggregate technology
constitutes a second externality. The fact that the typical consumer ignores
the positive eﬀect of public capital on the productivity of private capital when
making decisions will also lead her to invest below the socially optimal level.
In principle, these two technological externalities would suggest subsidizing
private investment. In this framework, it would be sound fiscal policy to
raise lump-sum taxes to finance subsidies on investment.
But there are also an important externality producing distortions on the
revenue side: the constraint to pay for a given amount of wasteful expendi-
tures produces a distortion in the form of a lower bound for required govern-
ment resources. The main result of the paper could be interpreted as follows:
if the government is eﬃcient, in the sense that wasteful public expenditures
ums, the environmental budget, among many others, may have a positive and significative
eﬀect on welfare. On the other hand, bureaucratic and administrative costs or interest
payments do not enhance welfare or production, so they can be considered as some kind of
wasteful government expenditure. A first-best resource allocation would reduce the level
of wasteful spending down to zero immediately, keeping it at that level forever. However,
wasteful public expenditures are far from zero in actual economies, being significant not
only in absolute values, but also as a percentage of total expenditures or total output.
Such a fraction could be seen as a measure of ineﬃciency in the public sector. With this
in mind, the main goal of the paper is to characterize a second-best allocation, conditioned
by the existence of an exogenous path of wasteful public expenditures, as described in our
fiscal externality.
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are relatively low, subsidizing factors’ income is optimal when aiming to
maximize welfare; on the other hand, it would be optimal to raise resources
from factors income. This fiscal externality distorts the consumption-saving
choice. So long as more resources are needed to finance wasteful expen-
ditures, less resources are left to consume and save. Moreover, whenever
raising revenues from lump-sum taxes, private consumption, an argument
in the utility function, suﬀers from most of the crowding-out eﬀect. Thus,
above certain levels of wasteful expenditures, collecting additional resources
from distortionary taxation turns optimal in order to reduce this excess of
crowding-out.
The absence of the spillover externality eliminates the main reason to
subsidize private investment. Hence, subsidies are then never optimal, no
matter how important the externality of public capital may be. This result
shows, first, that it is not necessary for optimally of factor income taxes that
the government be constrained by a high level of wasteful public expenditures.
Secondly, that the presence of a public capital externality is not, by itself,
enough to imply the optimally of income taxes.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic framework
is described. In section 3 the competitive equilibrium and the long-run
equilibrium path are characterized. In sections 4 the growth- and welfare-
maximizing public investment policies under income and lump-sum taxes are
characterized. Section 5 drives the interpretation of the results in terms of
the interaction between technological and fiscal externalities. Finally, section
6 ends with main conclusions and extensions.
2 The economy
The model draws on work by Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993), Glomm
and Ravikumar (1994) and Marrero and Novales (2003). The economy con-
sists of a continuum of identical firms, a fiscal authority and a representative
household.
2.1 Firms
Firms are identical, they rent the same amount of physical capital kt and
labor lt from households, and produce yt units of the consumption commod-
ity. The capital stock used on the aggregate by all firms, Kt, is taken as a
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proxy for the index of knowledge available to each single firm [Romer (1986)].
Finally, public capital, Kgt , is exogenous to the private production process
and aﬀects all individual firms in the same way. Except for these two tech-
nological externalities, yt is produced according to a standard Cobb-Douglas
function,
yt = f(lt, kt,Kt,K
g
t ) = Al
1−α
t k
α
t K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ , α, θ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where α is the share of private capital in output, θ and φ are the constant
elasticities of output with respect to public capital and the knowledge index,
and A is a technological scale.
Since all firms are identical, we can aggregate on (1) to obtain total
output, Yt,
Yt = AL
1−α
t K
(α+φ+θ)
t
µ
Kgt
Kt
¶θ
, (2)
where Lt, Kt are the total amounts of labor and physical capital used by
all firms in the economy. During period t, each firm pays the competitive-
determined wage wt on the labor it hires and the rate rt on the capital it
rents and thus, the profit maximizing problem of the firm turns out to be
static, leading to the usual marginal product conditions,
rt = f
0
kt = αAl
1−α
t k
α−1
t K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ = α
yt
kt
= α
Yt
Kt
, (3)
wt = f
0
lt = (1− α)Al
−α
t k
α
t K
φ
t (K
g
t )
θ = (1− α)yt
lt
= (1− α)Yt
Lt
, (4)
where we have used the fact that each firm treats its own contribution to the
aggregate capital stock as given. From these optimally conditions we have
the standard result on income distribution,
Yt = rtKt + wtLt. (5)
2.2 Public sector and fiscal policy
At any period t, the public sector collects taxes, Tt, to finance its total
expenditures, Gt, with Gt ≤ Yt for all period t. Expenditures are made up
by public investment, Igt , public services, C
g
t , and some kind of wasteful
public expenditure, Cwt , the latter not appearing as an argument on either
consumers’ utility or the aggregate production function. The ratio of wasteful
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public expenditures to output, Cwt /Yt, is exogenously given. Public capital
accumulates according to,
Kgt+1 = I
g
t + (1− δg)Kgt , (6)
with δg ∈ (0, 1) being the depreciation rate. We assume that public capital
is bounded above by ηtK0, with η ≥ 0, for all t.
All revenues are assumed to be raised through taxes. The government
can collect resources either by taxing proportionally total factors’ rents at a
rate τ t, or through lump-sum transfers from the private to the public sector,
Xt. For analytical convenience, we will focus on υt, the transfers to output
ratio Xt = υtYt. Debt issuing is not allowed in the economy, balances the
government’s budget every period,
Gt = I
g
t + C
g
t + C
w
t = τ tYt + υtYt, (7)
κt = Gt/Yt = τ t + υt, (8)
with κt ∈ [0, 1] being the total size of the public sector at period t. We denote
by κi,t, κc,t and κw,t the ratio of Igt , Cgt and Cwt to output, respectively, with
κj,t ≥ 0, j = i, c, w, and
P
j κj,t = κt.
The government decides on: i) investment on public capital, Igt , ii) public
consumption, Cgt , and iii) the way to finance expenditures, i.e., τ t and υt.
We assume these decisions are taken simultaneously. One of τ t and υt could
be negative, but they must be positive on the aggregate, since κt ≥ 0. When
τ t < 0 , the government is said to be subsidizing factors income while, if υt <
0, the government is transferring a fraction υt of output to the consumers.
A fiscal policyΠ is defined as a sequence of {πt}∞t=0, with πt = {κi,t,κg,t,κw,t, τ t, υt}.
Accordingly to (7) and (8), a feasible fiscal policy is a policy Π ∈ Λ, with
Λ ≡
n
πt = {κi,t,κg,t,κw,t, τ t, υt}∞t=0 : κj,t ≥ 0, j = {i, c, w} ,
X
j
κj,t = τ t + υt ∈ [0, 1]
o
,
for all period t. A stationary, feasible fiscal policy is a vector of constants,
π = (κi,κg,κw, υ, τ) with κj ≥ 0, j = {i, g, w}, and κi+κg+κw = υ+τ ≤ 1,
for all period t. The set of feasible and stationary policies is denoted by Λ¯.
2.3 Households
We assume zero population growth and population size is normalized to one.
The representative consumer is the owner of physical capital, and allocates
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her resources between consumption, Ct, and investment in physical capital,
It. Private physical capital accumulates over time according to,
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt, (9)
where Kt+1 denotes the stock of physical capital at the end of time t, with
K0 > 0 and δ denotes the depreciation rate for physical capital. Decisions
are made every period to maximize the discounted aggregate value of the
time separable, logarithmic utility function
Max
{Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βt [lnCt + ϕ lnC
g
t ] , (10)
subject to the resource constraint,
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Xt ≤ (1− τ t)(wtLt + rtKt), (11)
where β is the discount factor, between zero and one, and ϕ ≥ 0 determines
the relative appreciation for public and private consumption.
The consumer takes fiscal policy and factor prices as given when deciding
how to split her current income between consumption and savings. The
optimally condition for the consumer is,
Ct+1
Ct
= β [(1− δ) + (1− τ t+1)rt+1] , (12)
together with the budget constraint (11), the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
βtKt+1
∂U
∂Ct
≡ lim
t→∞
βtKt+1
1
Ct
= 0, (13)
and Kt+1 ≥ 0, Ct ≥ 0, for any period t.
The optimal time allocation of private consumption does not depend upon
public consumption because of the separability of the utility function, make
our results somewhat restrictive. In addition to the convenience of starting
with a simple model to better grasp the intuitions behind our results, separa-
bility is needed for the competitive equilibrium being analytically tractable.
Modelling nontrivial interactions between private and public consumption
requires numerical solution techniques, and it is left for future research.
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3 Equilibrium conditions and the balanced
growth path
3.1 The competitive equilibrium
For a feasible fiscal policy Π ∈ Λ, a Π-competitive equilibrium (Π-CE) is
defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given initial conditions K0, K
g
0 > 0, a Π-CE for the overall
economy is a vector of time series
©
Ct, C
g
t , C
w
t , Kt+1, K
g
t+1, It, I
g
t , Lt, Yt, rt, wt
ª∞
t=0
and a fiscal policy Π ∈ Λ, such that, given {rt, wt}∞t=0: (i) {Lt,Kt+1}∞t=0 solve
the profit maximizing problem of firms [i.e., (3)-(4) hold], (ii) {Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0
maximize the utility of households [i.e., (13), Ct,Kt+1 ≥ 0 and (12) and (11)]
hold, (iii) the technology constraints (2), (9), (6) hold and (iv) markets clear
every period:
Lt = 1, (14)
Yt = Ct + C
g
t + C
w
t + It + I
g
t . (15)
In fact, marginal utility at the origin equal to infinity guarantees that
strict inequalities will hold for Kt+1 > 0, Ct > 0 at all time periods, which
we use in what follows.
3.2 Balanced growth path
A balanced growth path, bgp, is a competitive equilibrium trajectory along
which aggregate variables grow at a zero or positive constant rate. Under
α + θ + φ = 1 and given a stationary and feasible fiscal policy Π ∈ Λ¯, it is
easy to show from equilibrium conditions that Yt, Ct, Kt, K
g
t , C
g
t , C
w
t and
Xt all grow at the same constant rate, denoted γ hereinafter, while bounded
variables, such as τ t, rt and υt, remain constant. As a consequence, the
ratios ct = Ct/Kt, k
g
t = K
g
t /Kt, yt = Yt/Kt, c
g
t = C
g
t /Kt, c
w
t = C
w
t /Kt and
xt = Xt/Kt also remain constant. This condition is similar to those in Barro
(1990), Rebelo (1991) and Jones and Manuelli (1997), among others, who
show that cumulative inputs must present constant returns to scale in the
private production process (i.e., α+ θ+ φ = 1) and rt must be constant and
high enough for level variables to display a positive and steady growth rate
in equilibrium. We assume in what follows that α+ θ + φ = 1.
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Conditions characterizing aΠ-CE can be particularized for a bgp-equilibrium
to,5
γ + δ = (1− κi − κg − κw)y − c, (16)
1 + γ = β [(1− δ) + (1− τ) r] , (17)
γ + δg = κiy(kg)−1, (18)
r = αy, (19)
y = A(kg)θ, (20)
κw = cw/y, (21)
τ = κi + κg + κw − υ. (22)
a system of equations in γ, c, kg, y, r, cg, cw. Condition (16) comes from
the global constraint of resources, (17) is the condition on the intertemporal
substitution of consumption, (18) is the public investment rule, (19) is the
gross return on capital accumulation, (20) is the production function, (21)
is the rule for wasteful expenditures, and (22) is the government budget
constraint. The solution to this system must be obtained numerically.
In parallel to Definition 1, a Π-bgp is defined:
Definition 2 Given a stationary fiscal policy Π ∈ Λ¯, a Π-bgp is a vector
(γ, c, kg, y, r, cg, cw) satisfying (16)-(22) with c > 0 and kg > 0.
The common growth rate property allows us to write the transversality
condition (13) along a bgp as limt→∞ βt (1 + γ) 1c = 0, which will clearly be
satisfied by any Π-bgp.
3.3 The full depreciation equilibrium
We assume in what follows that both types of capital fully depreciate every
period. This assumption enables us to obtain an analytical characterization
of Π-CE and Π-bgp allocations, which is one of the purposes of this paper.
3.3.1 Characterizing a Π-CE
The simplicity of the model allows for the Π-CE to be analytically charac-
terized. Regarding the decision rules for Ct and Kt+1, we make a linear guess
5We rid oﬀ the subindex t when considering values along the bgp.
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for their dependence on output: Ct = aYt and Kt+1 = bYt. Taking these
linear rules to: (12), (11), (8), (3), (4), (2) together with Lt = 1, we get,
Ct = [(1− κi − κg − κw)− βα(1− τ)]A (Kgt )
θ (Kt)
1−θ , (23)
Kt+1 = αβ (1− τ)A (Kgt )
θ (Kt)
1−θ , (24)
and combining (6), (2), Lt = 1 and the fact that I
g
t = κiYt, we get
Kgt+1 = κiA (K
g
t )
θK1−θt , (25)
a set of three equations characterizing the propagation mechanism for Ct,
Kt+1 and K
g
t+1 along a π-CE.
Since Ct, Kt+1 and K
g
t+1 need to be strictly positive in a Π-CE, the
following conditions must hold: A1) from (23), κi+κg+κw+βα(1−τ) < 1,
A2) from (24), τ < 1; A3) from (25), κi > 0. A1)-A3) are called feasibility
conditions. A1) means that there must be some resources left to consume,
after using available resources in the form of public expenditures and to
provide private capital for next period (net of subsidies); condition A2) shows
that households need positive rents, net of taxes, to consume and invest;
condition A3) means that public capital is essential in the private production
function.
Given K0, K
g
0 > 0, a fiscal policy Π and feasible conditions A1)-A3),
there exists a unique Π-CE allocation, the sequence {Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0 obtained
from the linear system (23)-(24) belonging to it.6 The characteristics of the
dynamics of Ct, Kt+1 and K
g
t+1 are given by the eigenvalue structure of the
coeﬃcient matrix of the state-space representation of the above system, in
logged variables [cˆ = ln(C), kˆ = ln(K), kˆg = ln(Kg)],
cˆt = d1,t + θkˆ
g
t + (1− θ) kˆt, (26)µ
kˆgt+1
kˆt+1
¶
=
µ
d2,t
d3,t
¶
+
µ
θ 1− θ
θ 1− θ
¶µ
kˆgt
kˆt
¶
,
where d1,t, d2,t and d3,t do not depend on state variables. That matrix has
a zero eigenvalue and a second eigenvalue equal to one. The zero eigenvalue
reflects the absence of transitional dynamics, while the unit eigenvalue is
inherent to endogenous growth models,7 implying that the ratios Kgt /Kt,
6See Marrero and Novales (2003) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994,1999).
7See King and Rebelo (1988) and Caballé and Santos (1993).
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Ct/Kt stay forever at constant levels, kg and c, respectively. Consequently,
given K0, K
g
0 > 0, the previous system provides us with the values of C0, K1
and Kg1 under either tax policy, the three variables growing from that time
on at the common rate γ given by (29).
3.3.2 Characterizing the Π-bgp
The full depreciation Π-bgp equilibrium is obtained by solving (16)-(22) for
{γ, c, kg, y, r, cg, cw} under δ = δg = 1:
kg =
κi
αβ (1− κi − κg − κw + υ)
, (27)
r = αA
·
κi
αβ (1− κi − κg − κw + υ)
¸θ
, (28)
γ = Aκθi [αβ(1− κi − κg − κw + υ)]
1−θ − 1, (29)
y = A
·
κi
αβ (1− κi − κg − κw + υ)
¸θ
, (30)
c =
Aκi [(1− κi − κg − κw)(1− αβ)− αβυ]
[αβ (1− κi − κg − κw + υ)]θ
, (31)
cg = κgy = κgA
·
κi
αβ (1− κi − κg − κw + υ)
¸θ
, (32)
cw = κwy = κwA
·
κi
αβ (1− κi − κg − κw + υ)
¸θ
(33)
where c, k, kg > 0 so long as A1)-A3) hold.
4 Taxing or subsidizing factors’ rents?
A benevolent planner maximizes households welfare under competitive equi-
librium conditions and the need to finance a fixed ratio of wasteful public
expenditures, κw ≥ 0, each period. She decides on i) the public invest-
ment/output ratio, ii) the public consumption/output ratio and iii) how to
split the financing of required public resources between lump-sum and income
taxes.
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Hence, public expenditures are chosen as a constant fraction of output
each period, as it is natural in a growth model. It is also a rule commonly
used in actual budgetary policy. There are four externalities in our model
economy, each linked to a specific parameter: i) public consumption in the
utility function, ϕ, ii) public capital in the production process, θ, iii) the
spillover eﬀect of private capital, φ, iv) the constraint to finance each period
a fixed fraction of wasteful public expenditures to output, κw.8
Condition (8) allows us to focus on the choice of κi, κg and υ. On the
other hand, from (8) and A1)-A3), the feasible set for the planner’s problem
is, given κw ∈ [0, 1),
Γ ≡ {ζ = (κi,κg, υ, τ) ∈ Λ : κi + κg + κw + βα(1− τ) < 1, τ < 1,κi > 0} .
(34)
We next find that subsidizing factors’ rents is by no means a definite re-
sult. On the contrary, raising taxes on factors’ income as part of an optimal
fiscal policy is a more pervasive result than it seems. We will show that a pos-
itive level of wasteful expenditures aﬀects the optimal composition of public
expenditures, but it also influences the optimal composition of taxes. High
enough levels of κw could make positive income taxes enhance welfare. More-
over, it could even be the case that the fraction of resources collected from a
distorting source be higher than that coming through lump-sum taxation.
4.1 Maximizing steady-state growth
In an economy without transitional dynamics, the consumption path is deter-
mined by applying to initial consumption the growth-rate along the bgp, so
that the influence of steady-state growth on welfare is obvious. We first char-
acterize the fiscal policy leading to a higher long-run growth rate, leaving the
discussion on the implied welfare levels for the next section. As it is usually
the case under endogenous growth, growth maximizing policies are rather
unrealistic, since they imply a huge sacrifice in consumption to produce fast
capital accumulation and growth. This section is hence ancillary, being useful
just to better interpret the results regarding welfare maximization.9
8Since κi and κg are chosen optimally, the relevant externality comes through κw,
which is taken as given by the government.
9Along the paper, an asterisk denotes a value obtained under a growth-maximizing
strategy.
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Proposition 3 Optimal choices to maximize the steady-state growth rate
are x∗g = 0, κ∗i = θ(1 − κw), υ∗ = (1− θ) (1− κw) 1−αβαβ > 0, τ ∗ = κw +
(1− κw)
³
1− 1−θαβ
´
.
Proof. See Appendix (part 1)
The level of κ∗i is the same as in Barro (1990). Since υ∗ is always positive,
the ratio s∗ of distortionary to lump-sum tax rates,
s∗ =
τ ∗
υ∗
=
κw (1− θ)− (1− αβ − θ)
(1− θ) (1− κw) (1− αβ)
= s∗(α,β, θ,κw) (35)
shares the same sign as τ ∗.
Proposition 4 There exists a threshold κ1∗w for κw,
κ1∗w =
1− αβ − θ
1− θ > 0, (36)
such that s∗, τ ∗ > 0 whenever κw > κ1∗w .
Proof. It comes directly from (35)
Taxing, rather than subsidizing, production factors is desirable in order to
maximize long-run growth whenever wasteful public expenditures are large
enough. The value of the κ1∗w -threshold is inversely related to α, θ and β.
Hence, the higher the values of κw, α, β and θ, the more likely it is that
public expenditures will be partly financed through distortionary taxation
when attempting to maximize steady-state growth.
The fact that private consumption cannot possibly become negative places
an upper bound on the possibility of raising lump-sum taxes, one of the rea-
sons explaining why taxing factors’ income may become growth-maximizing.
This result shows the trivial nature of the growth-maximization problem,
since it leads to exhaust all private resources to finance capital accumula-
tion, leaving no resources left for consumption. In this situation, it might
even be the case that the share of total resources collected through distor-
tionary taxation could be higher than that coming from lump-sum taxation.
This is precisely the case when κw > κ2∗w , with κ2∗w = 1− αβ(1−θ)(2−αβ) > κ1∗w ,
then s∗ > 1.
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4.2 Maximizing welfare
Given κw ≥ 0 and K0,Kg0 > 0, the absence of transition under full depreci-
ation of both types of capital reduces the problem of choosing κi, κg, υ and
τ to maximize welfare to,
max
ζ∈Γ
V (C0, γ) =
·
1
1− β (lnC0 + ϕ lnC
g
0 ) +
β (1 + ϕ)
(1− β)2 ln(1 + γ)
¸
, (37)
subject to (29). Plugging the expressions of C0, C
g
0 and γ into (37) we get,
V (ζ) =
1
1− β


ln [(1− κi − κg − κw)− βα(1− κi − κg − κw + υ)] + ϕ lnκg+
(1 + ϕ) lnY0+
+β(1+ϕ)
(1−β) ln
n
Aκθi [αβ(1− κi − κg − κw + υ)]
1−θ
o

 .
(38)
Proposition 5 Optimal choices for expenditure ratios an tax rates, in or-
der to maximize welfare are κ+g = ϕ1+ϕ (1− β) (1− κw) , κ
+
i = βθ (1− κw) ,
κ+ = 1−(1−A)(1−κw), where A = βθ+ ϕ1+ϕ (1− β), υ+ =
(1−θ−α)+βαθ+ϕ(1−θ)(1−αβ)
α(1+ϕ) (1− κw)
and τ+ = 1− (1− κw) 1−θα .
Proof. See Appendix (part 2)
Since υ+ is always positive, the ratio s+ of distortionary to lump-sum tax
rates,
s+ =
τ+
υ+
=
[α− (1− κw)(1− θ)] (1 + ϕ)
(1− κw) {(1− θ) [1 + ϕ(1− βα)]− α (1− βθ)} , (39)
shares the same sign as τ+.
Proposition 6 There is a threshold level κ1+w for κw,
κ1+w = 1−
α
1− θ , (40)
above which τ+ > 0.
Proof. It comes directly from (39)
This proposition shows that for a large enough level of wasteful gov-
ernment expenditures, κw > 1 − α1−θ , taxing factors’ income, rather than
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subsidizing them, is optimal. This is an interesting result because, first, if
the government is eﬃcient, in the sense that wasteful public expenditures
are relatively low, subsidizing factors’ income is optimal; second, the level of
wasteful expenditures defining an eﬃcient government is just a function of
technological parameters. Moreover, taxing factors’ income might be opti-
mum even for small levels of κw. For instance, in the absence of the spillover
externality from private capital, α = 1 − θ, taxing factors income becomes
optimal for any positive level of wasteful public expenditures. The level of
the κ1+w -threshold just depends on technological externalities: it is decreasing
in α and θ, and, fixing any of them, is increasing in φ. So, the higher α or
θ, the smaller the spillover externality, and more likely that taxing factors’
income becomes optimal.
It might even be optimal to raise through factor taxes a higher revenue
than through lump-sum transfers. That will be the case whenever κw >
κ2+w = 1− α[2(1−θ)+αβθ]−α 1+βϕ
1+ϕ
, in which case s+ > 1. The κ2+w -threshold now
depends on all structural parameters: it is decreasing in α and θ, increasing
with ϕ and increasing with β if θ > ϕ
1+ϕ .
Finally, the next corollary shows that it is more likely that taxing factors’
income can be optimal when maximizing welfare than when attempting to
maximize long-run growth.
Corollary 7 We have, for any economy, that κ1+w < κ1∗w .
Proof. It is straightforward from the expressions of κ1+w in (40) and κ1∗w in
(36)
4.3 Special cases
Having shown that distortionary taxation can be part of an optimal fiscal
policy, the relevant question relates to which specific aspects of our model
drive the optimally of factor income taxes. For a full interpretation of our
results, we consider in this section extreme cases of our model economy.
4.3.1 The spillover externality
If we assume φ = 0, then α = 1 − θ, and optimal expenditure ratios
and tax rates would be: κ+g = ϕ1+ϕ (1− β) (1− κw) , κ
+
i = βθ (1− κw),
υ+ = βθ(1−θ)+[ϕ−θ−β(1−θ)]
(1−θ)(1+ϕ) (1− κw) and τ+ = κw. The important result in this
16
case is that taxing factors income is always optimal, with independence of the
output elasticities of public and private capital. The absence of the spillover
externality eliminates the main reason to subsidize private investment. Sub-
sidies are then never optimal, no matter how important the externality of
public capital may be. This result shows, first, that it is not necessary for
optimally of factor income taxes that the government be constrained by a
high level of wasteful public expenditures. Secondly, that the presence of a
public capital externality is not, by itself, enough to imply the optimally of
income taxes.
4.3.2 The public capital externality
Under θ = 0, optimal expenditure ratios and tax rates would be: κ+g =
ϕ
1+ϕ (1− β) (1− κw) , κ
+
i = 0, υ
+ = (1−α)+ϕ(1−αβ)α(1+ϕ) (1− κw) and τ+ = 1 −
1−κw
α , and taxing factor income will be optimal for any wasteful expenditure
ratio above κ0w = 1 − α. The government does not invest in public capital,
but it still purchases some consumption commodity and pays for wasteful
expenditures. Taxes are optimal in this setup just for a large enough ratio
of wasteful expenditures. When neither type of aggregate capital appears
as a production input, we collapse to the AK model, since θ = φ = 0 and
α = 1, so that yt = Akt. Optimal expenditure ratios and tax rates then are,
κ+g = ϕ1+ϕ (1− β) (1− κw) , κ
+
i = 0, υ
+ = ϕ(1−β)
1+ϕ (1− κw) and τ+ = κw and
income taxes become again optimal for κw above 0.
4.3.3 The consumption externality
If the consumption externality was not present, ϕ = 0, optimal expendi-
ture ratios and tax rates would be: κ+g = 0, κ+i = βθ (1− κw) , υ+ =
(1−θ−α)+βαθ
α (1− κw) and τ+ = 1− (1− κw)
1−θ
α , so that optimal public con-
sumption would then be zero.
In economies with a spillover of private capital, α < 1 − θ, it will be
optimal to tax factors’ income if the ratio of wasteful expenditures is above
the general threshold in proposition 5, κ1+w = 1 − α1−θ , the consumption
externality not being necessary for distortionary taxation to be optimal. In
our model economy, this result has an alternative lecture: performing in an
optimal way, any increase in κg will be financed with lump-sum taxes.
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4.3.4 Expenditures as a proportion of output
Let us now suppose that wasteful public expenditures are constant over time,
as opposed to all other aggregate variables in the economy, which grow at
a constant rate γ. If wasteful expenditures are initially very large, lump-
sum financing might bring consumption to a very low level, preventing the
possibility of subsidizing private production inputs. Income taxes would then
be needed, showing that having a public expenditures target in the form of
a given proportion of output is not a necessary condition for factor taxes to
be part of an optimal fiscal policy. However, in a growth economy it makes
sense that wasteful public expenditures also grow at a positive rate.
5 Interpretation of results
In our model economy, the four possible uses of public funds are: i) public
investment, ii) public services, iii) wasteful expenditures and iv) subsidies
to factors’ rents. On the revenue side, the government decides on which
percentage of resources to raise through distortionary and non-distortionary
taxation, so as to maximize consumers’ welfare.10 The interaction between
technological and fiscal externalities is central to understanding why the gov-
ernment may end up taxing factor rents.
Externalities emerging from the presence of aggregate private capital and
the stock of public capital in the production function, both tend to produce
underinvestment in the competitive equilibrium solution, relative to the so-
cial optimum. Not perceiving the spillover externality of aggregate private
capital, the consumer takes into account a private marginal productivity of
capital below the social product of capital, leading to underinvestment. In
the competitive solution the consumer also ignores that the stock of public
capital next period, another input in the production function, is a given pro-
portion of current output and hence, a function of current investment. This
is a second factor that produces a gap between private and social marginal
products of physical capital, leading again to underinvestment. Because of
these externalities, a government will generally be interested in subsidizing
private investment and, whenever possible, the general tendency will be to
finance these subsidies through non distortionary taxation.
Deciding on the suitable policy, the purpose of the government is precisely
10Although decisions on revenue raising and spending are taken simultaneously.
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to reduce the eﬀects of these externalities. Whenever the public investment
to output ratio is chosen optimally, the government is able to mitigate the
under investment driven by the public capital externality. Thus, the public
capital externality is relevant to decide upon the optimal public expenditure
policy and the total amount of resources to be raised, but not to determine
whether subsidizing productive factors is optimal or not.
At this respect, the spillover externality plays a more relevant role, being
necessary for subsidies on production factors to be optimal. In general, rais-
ing public expenditure crowds out private consumption. Moreover, for ini-
tial periods, this crowding out is larger under lump-sum than under income
taxes, their diﬀerence turning more important the larger is the percentage of
wasteful public expenditure to output to be financed each period (the fiscal
externality).11
Thus, when both, the fiscal and the spillover externality, are positive in
the model two factors are moving in opposite directions. For any spillover
degree, there exists a wasteful public investment output ratio above which
taxing factor rents is always optimal, thus the government reduces the excess
of crowding-out of private consumption relative to private investment. In
fact, the absence of the spillover externality guarantees that taxing factor
rents is optimal for any positive wasteful public expenditure ratio.
5.1 A numerical example
We keep ϕ = .40 and β = .90 constant in Table 1, and change all other pa-
rameters, to find stationary equilibrium values and characterize optimal fiscal
policy. All variables are shown as a percentage of total output. The first four
columns show the parameterization used, including the ratio of wasteful ex-
penditures to output in the first column. Columns five and six show private
consumption and investment decisions, followed by optimal public decisions
on consumption and investment, all measured as a proportion of total out-
put. Together with wasteful expenditures, these four decisions exhaust total
output. Next columns show lump-sum taxes and distortionary taxes, both
as a proportion of total output, followed by their net value.
Total investment amounts to I + Ig = β (1− κw)Y, being therefore con-
stant for constant wasteful expenditure ratios. Public and private invest-
11This claim is easy to show, when, under the optimal public expenditure policy, we
compare C0 in (23) under alternative extreme tax scenarios (lump-sum taxes and factors’
income taxes). See Marrero and Novales (2003) for more details on this point.
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ment is high in our economy because of the full depreciation assumption on
both types of capital. This is the same reason why consumption levels are
relatively small.12 Public investment is increasing in φ, as it should be ex-
pected, while private investment is decreasing in α and φ through their sum,
I = β (1− κw) [1− (α+ φ)]Y.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Since the government chooses the optimal tax structure, a relevant ques-
tion is the relationship between diﬀerent types of financing and expenditures.
In particular, since the government faces the constraint to pay for wasteful
expenditures, a significant issue is the possible correspondence between re-
sources raised through lump-sum taxes and the wasteful component of public
expenditures. A possible view would think on financing wasteful expenditures
through lump-sum taxes. If these are not too large, the government might
still be able to raise additional resources to finance public investment, as well
as to subsidize private investment. If, on the other hand, wasteful expendi-
tures exhaust a good percentage of output, the government might face the
need to raise taxes on factors income, rather than subsidizing them, in order
to finance public investment.
Our results show this intuition to be partially wrong: Figure 1 and 2 shows
that, as a function of κw, optimal lump-sum taxes, υ+/κw, fall very quickly
as a proportion of wasteful expenditures. For reasonable values of wasteful
expenditures, optimal lump-sum taxes are well above the level needed to
pay for them as well as for public consumption. This is even more so in
economies with a small spillover eﬀect from aggregate private capital. Both
eﬀects combine to make governments be more sensible towards providing
public capital, which suggest raising additional revenues. The fact that lump-
sum taxes are so large, relative to this expenditure component, shows that
the government is additionally interested in financing subsidies on private
capital accumulation through lump-sum taxes. In this situation, the positive
distortion is financed through a non-distorting mechanism. Additionally,
taxing factor incomes may turn out to be optimal for almost any level of
wasteful expenditures.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
12With β smaller than 0.3, total consumption and investment would be, respectively,
around a 75% and 25% of total output, which are quiet simmilar to that observed for main
Occidental Economies.
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Optimally of taxes also arises for very diﬀerent values of α, the output
elasticity of private investment. The more relevant factor determining op-
timally of income taxes seems to be that the spillover of aggregate private
capital not be too important. However, as the last row shows, even with
a large spillover externality, taxing factor income will be optimal under im-
portant wasteful expenditures. In fact, taxes are a significant proportion of
output in this case.
6 Final Remarks
In an economy with a spillover eﬀect from aggregate private capital, we have
characterized the optimal fiscal policy from the point of view of a benevolent
planner, assuming that it is constrained to pay for wasteful public expen-
ditures. These are given as a fixed proportion of output. We assume the
government cannot issue any debt, so it has three decisions to make: i) in-
vestment on public capital, ii) public consumption and iii) the combination
of lump-sum and income taxes to finance public expenditures. Public capi-
tal enters as an input in the aggregate technology, while public consumption
aﬀects consumers’ preferences. Subsidies might be interesting because of the
presence of the two technological externalities: the spillover from private
capital, and the presence of public capital as a production input.
We have shown that optimally of factor income taxes may be a more
pervasive result than usually thought. It is a somewhat natural result in
the absence of the private capital spillover, but it may also arise when that
spillover externality is significant. The constraint to pay for a relatively high
level of wasteful public expenditures can be enough to impose taxes, rather
than subsidies, on private production factors as part of an optimal fiscal
policy. Taxing income may be optimal for reasonable parameterization, with
the public capital externality and the spillover eﬀect from aggregate private
capital, in spite of the fact that both externalities tend to favor subsidizing
production factors.
Taxing factor incomes can turn out to be optimal for any level of wasteful
government expenditures, as shown, in a limit example, by the no spillover
case. However, without wasteful expenditures, subsidizing, rather than tax-
ing factor income would be optimal under private capital spillover in the
production function. Whenever that externality is present, a given level of
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wasteful expenditures is needed for distortionary taxation to be optimal.
Public capital as a production input reinforces the role of the private capital
spillover to make subsidies on factor incomes to be optimal. That raises the
level of wasteful public expenditures needed for factor income taxes to be
optimal.
The presence of public consumption as an argument in the utility function
is an element in favor of raising public resources via taxes. Although the first
choice would be to raise lump-sum taxes, that might leave too few resources
for consumption, and imposing income taxes might be better. However,
we have shown this externality in preferences not to be necessary for the
optimally of income taxes.
There is a strong dichotomy in the economy we have considered: public
consumption depends only on parameters in preferences, while public invest-
ment depends mostly on parameters in the production technology. From the
point of view of government revenues, we get that, as a percentage of output,
distortionary taxes depend just on technology parameters, while lump-sum
taxes also depend on parameters in preferences. That determines that an in-
crease in public consumption will be financed through lump-sum taxes. One
extension to this research should go in the direction of considering a non-
separable utility function in private and public consumption, to avoid this
dichotomy.
On the other hand, the payment of interests due to the outstanding debt
is a way of wasteful public expenditure. Thus, the lack of discipline today in
the current public budget will make raise wasteful public expenditures in the
future and thus taxing rather than subsidizing factor rents turning optimal.
As a second extension to this research, issuing debt must be allowed in order
to analyze the relationship between public deficit and optimal taxation.
We have shown that it is more likely that taxes be part of an optimal
fiscal policy if the government cares about maximizing welfare than about
maximizing growth. This suggests that long-run eﬀects tend to be favor-
able to subsidizing production factors, while short-run considerations tend
to push for taxing factor incomes. Hence, a second extension should look at
an economy with non-trivial transition. A simple way of doing that would
consist on explicitly including leisure in the utility function. An alternative
approach would consider less than full depreciation. A continuity argument
suggests that our results will be robust to high depreciation rates. On the
other hand, the lower the depreciation rates of private and public capital, the
slower the transition would be, placing a heavier weight on short-run eﬀects
22
and thus favoring taxes on factor incomes.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Part 1: proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From (29), it is easy to see that, i) for any given values of xi, xg and
xw, γ is strictly increasing in υ, ii) for any given xi, xw and υ, γ¯ is inversely
related to xg. Hence, to maximize steady-state growth, we set x∗g = 0 and
choose υ as large as possible, to approach υ∗ = (1−κw−κi)(1−αβ)αβ > 0 defined
by (34). By continuity, we set υ = υ∗ into (29) and the problem reduces to
choosing κi so as to maximize, γ¯0,
γ¯0 = Aκθi
·
αβ
µ
1− κi − κw +
(1− κw − κi) (1− αβ)
αβ
¶¸1−θ
− 1.
Since γ¯0 is strictly concave in κi, condition ∂γ¯0/∂κi = 0 gives us the value of
κi maximizing steady-state growth,
κ∗i = θ(1− κw),
and substituting into (8), we get the growth-maximizing levels of income and
lump-sum tax rates
7.2 Part 2: proof of Proposition 5
Proof. It is easy to show that V is not monotonic in either κi, κc and υ.
Moreover, for any given υ, we have lim
κi,κc→0+
V = lim
κi,κc→1−
V = −∞, so the
welfare-maximizing levels of κi, κc fall in the interior of [0, 1]2. This is not
the case for υ, whose optimal value may fall above 1 or below 0. V (ζ) defined
from (38) is strictly concave in ζ, so condition ∇V (ζ) = 0 is necessary and
suﬃcient for a global maximum,
∂V
∂κi
= − (1− βα)
1− κ − βα (1− κ + υ) +
β (1 + ϕ) θ
(1− β)κi
− β (1 + ϕ) (1− θ)
(1− β) (1− κ + υ) = 0,(41)
∂V
∂υ
= − βα
1− κ − βα (1− κ + υ) +
β (1 + ϕ) (1− θ)
(1− β) (1− κ + υ) = 0, (42)
∂V
∂κg
= − (1− βα)
1− κ − βα (1− κ + υ) +
ϕ
κg
− β (1 + ϕ) (1− θ)
(1− β) (1− κ + υ) = 0, (43)
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where κ = κi + κg + κw. Adding up (42) and (43), we get,
υ = (1− κ)( 1
αβ
− 1)− κg
ϕ
1
αβ
, (44)
1− κ + υ = 1− τ =
µ
1− κ − κg
ϕ
¶
1
αβ
, (45)
while combining (41) and (43), we get the relationship between the welfare
maximizing levels of κi and κg,
κ+i = β
1 + ϕ
1− β
θ
ϕ
κ+g . (46)
Using (45) in (42) we get,
− βα
1− κ −
³
1− κ − κgϕ
´ + β (1 + ϕ) (1− θ)
(1− β)
³
1− κ − κgϕ
´
1
βα
,
which leads to,µ
1− κi − κg − κw −
κg
ϕ
¶
[(1− β) + β (1 + ϕ) (1− θ)]
= β (1 + ϕ) (1− θ) (1− κi − κg − κw) ,
from where we get the relationship,
κ+g =
ϕ
1 + ϕ
1− β
(1− β) + β (1− θ)
¡
1− κ+i − κw
¢
.
Combining this expression with (46), we get,
κ+g =
ϕ
1 + ϕ
(1− β) (1− κw) ,
and,
κ+i = βθ (1− κw) .
Then,
κ+ = κ+i + κ+g + κw = 1−
·
1− βθ − ϕ
1 + ϕ
(1− β)
¸
(1− κw) =
= 1− (1−A)(1− κw); A = βθ +
ϕ
1 + ϕ
(1− β) ,
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and
υ+ = (1− κ+)
µ
1
αβ
− 1
¶
−
κ+g
ϕ
1
αβ
=
= (1− κw)
·µ
1− βθ − ϕ
1 + ϕ
(1− β)
¶µ
1
αβ
− 1
¶
− 1
αβ
1− β
1 + ϕ
¸
=
=
(1− θ − α) + βαθ + ϕ (1− θ) (1− αβ)
α (1 + ϕ)
(1− κw) .
Then, the optimal tax rate on factors income,
τ+ = κ+ − υ+ =
= 1−(1− κw)
·
1− βθ + (1− θ − α)− αϕ (1− β) + βαθ + ϕ (1− θ) (1− αβ)
α (1 + ϕ)
¸
=
= 1− (1− κw)
1− θ
α
.
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8 Tables and Graphics
Figure 1: Optimal υ/κw vs. κw under alternative parameterization (1)
Beta=0.9, Phi=0.4, Theta=0.2
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Figure 2: Optimal υ/κw vs. κw under alternative parameterization (2)
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Table 1: Optimal fiscal policy and stationary equilibrium values
Lump-Sum Distortionary TOTAL Lump-Sum Distortionary
Xw α φ θ C I Ig (*) Cg (*) Cw Taxes (*) Taxes (*) TAXES Taxes Taxes
0.15 0.75 0.00 0.25 6.1% 57.4% 19.1% 2.4% 15.0% 21.6% 15.0% 36.6% 1.4 1.0
0.15 0.75 0.10 0.15 6.1% 65.0% 11.5% 2.4% 15.0% 25.2% 3.7% 28.9% 1.7 0.2
0.15 0.75 0.25 0.00 6.1% 76.5% 0.0% 2.4% 15.0% 30.8% -13.3% 17.4% 2.1 -0.9
0.15 0.40 0.00 0.60 6.1% 30.6% 45.9% 2.4% 15.0% 48.3% 15.0% 63.3% 3.2 1.0
0.15 0.40 0.35 0.25 6.1% 57.4% 19.1% 2.4% 15.0% 95.9% -59.4% 36.6% 6.4 -4.0
0.15 1.00 0.00 0.00 6.1% 76.5% 0.0% 2.4% 15.0% 2.4% 15.0% 17.4% 0.2 1.0
0.30 0.75 0.00 0.25 5.0% 47.3% 15.8% 2.0% 30.0% 17.8% 30.0% 47.8% 0.6 1.0
0.30 0.75 0.10 0.15 5.0% 53.6% 9.5% 2.0% 30.0% 20.8% 20.7% 41.5% 0.7 0.7
0.30 0.75 0.25 0.00 5.0% 63.0% 0.0% 2.0% 30.0% 25.3% 6.7% 32.0% 0.8 0.2
0.30 0.40 0.00 0.60 5.0% 25.2% 37.8% 2.0% 30.0% 39.8% 30.0% 69.8% 1.3 1.0
0.30 0.40 0.35 0.25 5.0% 47.3% 15.8% 2.0% 30.0% 79.0% -31.3% 47.8% 2.6 -1.0
0.30 1.00 0.00 0.00 5.0% 63.0% 0.0% 2.0% 30.0% 2.0% 30.0% 32.0% 0.1 1.0
0.15 0.50 0.20 0.30 6.1% 53.6% 23.0% 2.4% 15.0% 59.4% -19.0% 40.4% 4.0 -1.3
0.15 0.30 0.20 0.50 6.1% 38.3% 38.3% 2.4% 15.0% 97.3% -41.7% 55.7% 6.5 -2.8
0.15 0.40 0.20 0.40 6.1% 45.9% 30.6% 2.4% 15.0% 75.5% -27.5% 48.0% 5.0 -1.8
0.3 0.50 0.20 0.30 5.0% 44.1% 18.9% 2.0% 30.0% 48.9% 2.0% 50.9% 1.6 0.1
0.3 0.30 0.20 0.50 5.0% 31.5% 31.5% 2.0% 30.0% 80.2% -16.7% 63.5% 2.7 -0.6
0.3 0.40 0.20 0.40 5.0% 37.8% 25.2% 2.0% 30.0% 62.2% -5.0% 57.2% 2.1 -0.2
Note: bold letters shows those cases where taxing factor rents is optimal
(*) Optimal policy
% of wasteful expenditures% of total output
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